GGP: Russia’s Use of the “Energy Weapon” in Europe
The statements, opinions and data contained in the content published in Global Gas Perspectives are solely those of the individual authors and contributors and not of the publisher and the editor(s) of Natural Gas World.
The following is an excerpt from a Baker Institute Issue Brief originally published on July 18, 2017.
In June 2017, the US Senate voted 98–2 to pass a bill designed to strengthen existing US sanctions against Russia, including a provision that would allow sanctions against those who provide capital, services, or other support to projects that build, expand, or even maintain Russian energy export pipelines.
The fact that US policymakers are now openly debating extraterritorial measures to punish those who facilitate Russian energy exports suggests the two countries’ geoeconomic frictions could escalate, with commensurate impacts for E&Ps, service companies, and capital providers.
Transatlantic disputes over projects like the proposed Nord Stream-2 (NS-2) pipeline—which would increase Russian gas supplies to Europe—will likely continue for years to come, as US-Russia geopolitical competition intensifies and the political toxicity of Russia-related matters rises in Washington.
Accordingly, this brief aims to inform and contextualize the discussion by (1) quantifying the potential exposure of key European countries to Russian gas price and supply manipulation, (2) showing how Moscow has used energy as an instrument of coercive diplomacy since the early 1990s, and (3) briefly assessing the impacts and future policy implications of Russian entities’ past use of the “energy weapon” in and near Europe.
Gabriel Collins, J.D., Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs, Center for Energy Studies
The statements, opinions and data contained in the content published in Global Gas Perspectives are solely those of the individual authors and contributors and not of the publisher and the editor(s) of Natural Gas World.