Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in New Caspian Tensions
The southern Caspian has got even more complex over the past week, as tensions surface between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over disputed gas reserves. Although unlikely to lead to anything serious, the confrontation is likely to further reduce the odds for a Trans-Caspian Pipeline and will make potential Caspian investors a little more nervous.
The incident began on 18 June when Turkmenistan’s ambassador in Baku Toyly Komekov was summoned to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, where he received a dressing-down from Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov.
According to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan was attempting to conduct seismic work on the disputed Serdar/Kyapaz gasfield (the Turkmen and Azeri names, respectively) in the central Caspian. This, Khalafov said, violated the terms of a 2008 agreement which stipulated that both sides would avoid developing the field until their maritime border was fully delimited. Azerbaijan, the Foreign Ministry warned, “reserves the right to conduct appropriate activities related to the protection of own sovereign rights in the Caspian Sea”.
Ashgabat disputed this version of events, and issued a note in which it “strongly protests the attempts of illegal actions on the part of the Azerbaijani border guards” against a seismic vessel conducting research in Serdar/Kyapaz. It also matched Baku’s bluster by announcing that “in case of continuation of such provocations the Turkmen side would take appropriate actions”.
Serdar/Kyapaz lies in the central Caspian in the ‘grey area’ which has been disputed between Baku and Ashgabat since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Lack of clarity on Caspian maritime borders has complicated the development of several fields and has, notably, created tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan.
The field has also been caused some recent stand-offs between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Wikileaks cables that recently came to light show that in 2008 there were at least two incidents when Azerbaijani gunboats threatened research vessels which were prospecting in the area around Serdar/Kyapaz.
In at least one instance, the ship (working for Malaysia’s Petronas) was well within Turkmenistan’s waters – the Azerbaijani patrol boats were significantly outside of their jurisdiction. When Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov confronted his Azerbaijani counterpart about the issue, Ilham Aliev denied knowing anything about it.
The details of the latest incident remain unclear; Turkmenistan may indeed have been conducting research on the field, in violation of the 2008 agreement, but the tendency of the Azerbaijani navy to overstep their bounds suggests that research vessels in uncontested waters may also have been threatened.
The likelihood of a military clash over the field is very low. For one, neither Turkmenistan nor Azerbaijan has a navy which is capable of monitoring the Caspian or defending their energy assets in a sustained confrontation. The US, which has played a significant role in mediating between Ashgabat in Baku in the past, would also work to reduce tensions and reassure international oil companies working in the Caspian.
But the stand-off underlines the ongoing problems thrown up by the Caspian’s lack of clear borders. There are no reliable estimates on the size of Serdar/Kyapaz but given the surrounding geology (which includes Azerbaijan’s mammoth ACG field) it could contain significant volumes of gas. Although neither side is exactly short of gas resources, both are keen to secure their long-term future as a gas superpower and a key exporter for markets including Europe and China.
The confrontation will also be a further setback to a Trans-Caspian Pipeline to bring Turkmen gas to Europe. Already Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and the EU (which is mediating between them) have all stepped back from torturous negotiations on building the controversial pipeline.
Gunboat diplomacy will hardly help matters: after the 2008 confrontations, Berdymuhammedov insisted that “we're going back to demanding full delimitation before any other technical consideration [of a TCP]. I don't care how long it takes. I have to project our national interests.” He may take the same step now, holding off on a TCP until the maritime boundary is delimited.
Given Azerbaijan’s lukewarm enthusiasm in the project, Baku is unlikely to be bothered by such a threat. For the EU, which has a vested interest in a TCP to ensure that Turkmen gas comes to Europe in the long term, the deterioration in the Caspian is further bad news. The European Commission has yet to make a public call for restraint. If it is serious about keeping the TCP project alive it will need to cool the tensions – and, in the long run, help Baku and Ashgabat to find a lasting solution to the Serdar/Kyapaz dispute.
Alex Jackson is a political risk analyst at Menas Associates in London, focusing on the Caspian region. He also writes independently on politics, security and energy in the wider Caspian region. This article does not necessarily reflect the views of his employers.