Ukraine: Shaky Ceasefire Underlines Russia’s Uncertain Position
While the most recent developments in eastern Ukraine have raised hopes for a de-escalation of the conflict, they have also raised serious questions about Russia’s strategic goals, and its influence over secessionist rebels in Donetsk and Lugansk. On 20 January Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko declared a unilateral, seven day ceasefire, which Russia initially rejected. Subsequent developments appeared to signal an imminent Russian invasion, potentially in the guise of a peacekeeping force. Russia’s decision to back a ceasefire on 23 June, and the Federation Council’s approval of Vladimir Putin’s request to rescind its authorisation to use force in Ukraine two days later, therefore represent a major volte face. It also was also a welcome sign for European gas consumers, after an explosion at a Ukrainian gas pipeline near Poltava raised fears that combatants in Ukraine might begin to directly target the country’s energy infrastructure.
From aggression to conciliation, and back again
This is not the first time Moscow has shifted its Ukraine policy. In March, Russia amassed 40,000 troops on the border and the Federation Council gave Putin legal authorisation to use them on Ukrainian territory. In mid-April, the separatist insurgency began with Russian support. Referendums on independence were scheduled for 11 May, raising fears Russia would repeat its annexation of Crimea. Then Russia reversed course in May by publicly urging the separatists to abandon the referendums. Subsequent contact between Putin and Poroshenko raised hopes for negotiations.
This brief détente collapsed on 14 June when insurgents shot down a Ukrainian IL-76 military transport aircraft, killing 49 personnel. The incident prompted a riot at the Russian embassy in Kiev, which was given extensive coverage in Russian state media. The following week Russia began to move its forces back to the border once more and cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine on 16 June. Russia initially rejected Poroshenko’s unilateral ceasefire declaration on 20 June, calling it an ‘ultimatum’, as reports of unmarked Russian vehicles under rebel control appeared online. But Russia reversed itself again, backing the ceasefire and rescinding Putin’s authorisation to use force.
Russia’s strategic objectives remain unclear – possibly even to Moscow
The Russian elite appear divided as to the ultimate goals in Ukraine. Moscow has issued vague outlines for a peace settlement, but has not set out a clear negotiating position, or even officially acknowledged its role in the crisis.
Some hardliners in the regime are believed to be pushing Putin to either absorb eastern Ukraine’s territory, or to set up a puppet state supported by Russian ‘peacekeepers’. Russia has done so before, in territories such as Transnistria and Abkhazia. Ukraine remains highly significant in Russia’s nationalist discourse, and even moderate nationalists have found it difficult to accept Ukrainian independence.
More technocratic members of the elite are concerned that Western sanctions levied as a result will undermine the Russian economy, which already showed signs of slowing down prior to the crisis. This is politically problematic for Putin, as he has based his legitimacy largely upon the government’s ability to deliver economic and social gains. A prolonged period of hardship, even if endured in the service of a nationalist mission, would be highly destabilising.
Moscow’s oscillation between aggressive and conciliatory stances towards Ukraine may simply be a means of attempting to keep Kiev and its allies off balance. Putin is known to be a shrewd tactician and keen practitioner of psychological warfare. However, his government is also noted for its similarity to a feudal court system, with policy-making often determined by whichever group is currently in favour. Moscow’s shifting Ukraine policy could suggest that Putin has yet to pick which elite group’s concerns and outlook he shares.
The success of Putin’s own propaganda may have also reduced his room for political manoeuvring. Alarmist reports on the situation in Ukraine from both state media and government sources, of a ‘fascist’ government intent on ‘genocide’ of the Russian population, have created a popular expectation of action among the Russian people. Ideologists of Russian imperialism and ‘Eurasianism’, such as Alexander Dugin and Alexander Prokhanov, have been lifted from obscurity and official disfavour to near ubiquity in the Russian mass media. After unleashing these forces in Russian domestic politics it is not certain Putin can control them and negotiate a settlement with Poroshenko.
The Kremlin can promise peace, but may not be able to deliver
An alternative explanation for Russia’s indecision may be that it has lost control over the insurgency itself. Incidences of lawlessness, including the kidnapping of observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have proved highly embarrassing for Russia, as was the decision by rebel leaders to ignore Putin’s request that they refrain from holding independence referendums. The motivation and allegiance of many of the insurgents are also suspect. Many are believed to be drawn from local gangs and mafia groups seeking to opportunistically profit from the chaos and disorder.
At the end of May the Vostok battalion an irregular Chechen military force, organised by Russian military intelligence, entered the conflict and seized control of the insurgency’s headquarters in Donetsk. This act greatly reduced Russia’s plausible deniability that it was playing an active role in the conflict, but was apparently necessary to restore a degree of Russian control over the rebellion. While Vostok achieved some success in restoring discipline, it now looks to have been short lived. On 24 June rebel forces shot down a Ukrainian Mi-8 military helicopter, killing nine, threatening the collapse of the ceasefire less than a day after it was agreed.
Whether Russia is undecided in its objectives, or is enacting a shrewd policy of strategic ambiguity, its ability to directly influence the insurgency appears to be limited. By supporting the rebels Moscow has ensured it will have a seat at the table in any peace process or political settlement. However, due to its reliance on proxy forces it may also have compromised its ability to make credible commitments.
While the Ukraine crisis has not yet had an immediate effect on European gas markets, the likelihood of serious supply disruptions will inevitably grow as the crisis continues. Ukraine has not felt compelled to siphon gas from Russian shipments to European customers. Kiev still has reserves, its most gas intensive industries are concentrated in the areas where the rebellion is strongest, and it has negotiated a reverse-flow supply deal with Slovakia that will alleviate some of its dependence on Russia. However, the longer the violence continues in east Ukraine the greater the likelihood of damage to gas pipes. Ukraine’s gas needs will also grow far beyond what Slovakia can supply when summer ends and the temperature drops.
By Dr Daragh McDowell, Senior Russia Analyst at risk advisory company Maplecroft a Natural Gas Europe Industry Partner.
For more information on Maplecroft's latest in-depth Country Risk Report for Russia, please visit: http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2014/06/18/geopolitical-manoeuvring-continues-amid-standoff-west-country-risk-report/