Turkish-Iranian Competition in the Middle East
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a formal visit to Iran on April 7, 2015. The trip was designed to try to repair bilateral relations after their severe breakdown linked to the crisis in Yemen. Indeed, the conservative wing of the ruling establishment in Tehran, including the head of Iran’s Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Huseyn Nakavi, demanded that Erdogan’s Iran visit should be delayed (BBC–Turkish service, April 7). Some even warned the government that if Erdogan did not cancel the visit, the issue would be brought before Iran’s Guardian Council. Despite this negative pressure, the Turkish president did end up traveling to Tehran to clarify Ankara’s position (Radikal, April 7).
Four significant issues have contributed to this nadir in Turkish-Iranian relations: Iraq, Syria, Yemen and energy. Regarding Syria, the only area of agreement between Ankara and Tehran is their firm opposition to the Islamic State. However, Iran has continued to support the beleaguered Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey backs the united opposition. On Iraq, Turkey still sees Iran acting as a manipulator in bilateral Ankara-Baghdad relations. Although from time to time Tehran sends positive messages on this issue, in reality, these are tactical games on Iran’s part (Internet Haber, March 4). In recent months, as the war in Yemen continued to spiral out of control, Turkey has sided with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates and supported their international military action backing the embattled Yemeni regime. Iran, on the other hand, stands behind the Houthi rebels who are fighting on the other side of this conflict.
Over the past fifteen years, these regional issues have become increasingly contentious for Ankara and Tehran. The reason, as many experts contend, is related to the relative power of Iran in the region. For one thing, its power and ability to influence other regional actors has grown after the Arab Spring. Moreover, Iran has been strengthening regional Shia groups and building a crescent of influence in the Middle East. In addition, some have argued that Iran now feels more confident after reaching a framework agreement with the 5+1 Western countries on its nuclear program (Internet Haber, March 4; Radikal, March 18).
Another key point of contention between Turkey and Iran has become the issue of energy. “Turkey, as a country, is the largest consumer of [natural] gas from Iran, and yet it pays the highest price,” President Erdogan declared while in Tehran (BBC–Turkish service, April 7). Turkey expects a possible discount on the gas volumes it already imports from Iran; but Tehran has, so far, ignored these pleas. Speaking to journalists, on April 14, Iranian Fuel Minister Bijen Namdar Zengene said that Tehran’s proposal of lowering the gas purchase in exchange for Turkey buying double the volumes was rejected by Ankara. Annually, Turkey buys 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from Iran. Sources from the Turkish Ministry of Energy confirm that Iran proposed selling Turkey another 10 bcm of gas at a gradually decreasing price scheme, but without changing the price it charges Ankara for the first 10 bcm. Turkish Foreign ministry sources declared that this proposal was not acceptable to authorities in Ankara (Hurriyet, April 17).
In addition to the subject of energy sales, the website Iran.ru, controlled by the Iranian embassy to Moscow, earlier this year published an article criticizing Turkey’s developing role as a regional gas hub. “Turkey, as an ‘Energy Hub’ country, [will be] dangerous for Iran,” the article asserts, adding, “and Iran does not understand why Russia has been helping Turkey in this process. Russia supports Iran via strategic cooperation [but] assists Ankara on the energy issue—which is not preferable for these nations [Russia and Iran]. Russia must defend Iran’s interests” (Iran.ru, January 23).
Relations between Russia, Turkey and Iran are being influenced by a complicated set of cross-cutting and often contradictory interests. Ankara, expecting that its warm relations with Russia would bolster Turkey’s international role, has felt uncomfortable with growing Iranian strength in the Middle East as a result of improving relations between Tehran and the West (Iran.ru, February 27). For one thing, Turkey is concerned about the fact that Iran has not taken any firm action on helping to resolve the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, if the economic sanctions on Iran are terminated, the Islamic Republic could grow to become the preeminent power in the region. That is why Ankara is assisting Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in their campaign over Yemen (Hurriyet, April 24). This support clearly has a tactical dimension, particularly against the background of Turkey’s own disagreements with Saudi Arabia on Yemen. Moreover, relations between Ankara and Cairo have been virtually frozen after Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in Egypt two years ago (Turkiye, April 25).
Meanwhile, Turkish media has been hinting that relations with Israel might again come up for debate following Turkey’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 7. The geopolitical struggles in the Middle East are encouraging Turkey and Israel to rebuild a new, cordial relationship. But some experts infer that, in exchange for re-normalizing relations, Turkey will expect help from Israel on Syria. Without any dedicated alliances in the Middle East, Turkey is pursuing a series of tactical policy steps wherever it can find areas of common interest with other regional players. In the absence of any other allies in the Middle East, Turkey has been relying on political support from the United States—a fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member. But the insufficient backing it has received from Washington on the Syria issue has left Ankara feeling uncomfortable (CNN–Turkish service, April 24).
Turkey’s Middle East policy is thus in a current state of flux. But in its quest for new regional partnerships, it is unlikely to seek out either Iran or Russia. Rather, Turkey may be expected to seek closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia or re-build its relations with Israel. Recently, Turkey appears to have swung its attention more toward Saudi Arabia—President Erdogan attended the funeral of Saudi King Abdullah (Today’s Zaman, January 23) and later paid a formal visit to the country in March (Al-Monitor, March 3). These exchanges may herald a coming breakthrough in bilateral Saudi-Turkish relations in the near future. Though Turkey’s ultimate decision between moving closer to Israel or Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly have to wait until after the June 7 elections.
Orhan Gafarli
April 22nd, 2015 12:00am Posted In: Energy Security & Supply, News By Country, Featured Articles, Turkey, Energy Security, Expert Views, EU Energy Union
Will Turkey Choose the European or Eurasian Energy Union?
The sixth meeting of the World Forum on Energy Regulation is scheduled to be held on May 25–28, in Istanbul, and is being organized by the office of the prime minister of the Turkish Republic. The competitive and dynamically expanding nature of the energy sector in Eurasia has been boosting Turkey’s regional importance as it prepares to take on the role of a strategically important transit and energy hub country (Hurriyet Daily News, January 28).
December 2014 saw the reemergence of competition between rival pipeline projects in Eurasia—similar to the earlier competition between the Nabucco natural gas pipeline, proposed by a consortium of European companies, and Russia’s South Stream. Currently, Russia’s new proposed pipeline project—Turkish Stream—is challenging the Azerbaijani-initiated Southern Gas Corridor, which will carry Caspian-basin gas to Europe via the South Caucasus, Turkey and then across Southeastern Europe. Turkey is already signed on to the Southern Gas Corridor—the Corridor’s longest pipeline segment, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), will cross Turkey from east to west—but it is also being strongly courted by Moscow to host Turkish Stream (see EDM, December 17, 2014; February 20, 2015). This growing significance of Turkey in competing large-scale energy transit projects across Europe and Eurasia has also opened up a discussion domestically regarding which prospective energy union the country should become part of—European or Eurasian.
In particular, the Turkish media has been discussing the idea of an Energy Union for Eurasia since the beginning of the year. Gurkan Kumbaroglu, the Istanbul-based president-elect of the International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE), said that his organization aims to create an energy union that will include 18 countries and be under the supervision of Turkey, Russia and Azerbaijan. According to the IAEE, the formation of this regional entity was agreed at a meeting that included Kumbaroglu as well as representatives from the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) (Yeni Safak, January 27).
Kumbaroglu said the IAEE’s aim is to gather Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Romania, Kazakhstan, Greece, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Slovenia under the same project, particularly because many of these countries have cool or antagonistic relationships and have never effectively worked together before. “As the IAEE, we hope to invest in these countries, establish workshops and form business opportunities,” Kumbaroglu explained. (Daily Sabah, January 26). In addition, the Eurasian Energy Union has started discussions on the establishment of a common energy platform among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan within the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (Souzveche.ru, March 6).
Notably, the office headquarters for the IAEE’s Eurasian Energy Union will be located in Istanbul, which SOCAR enthusiastically supports. According to Azerbaijani energy expert Fuad Alizade, “Turkey will be a good platform for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for establishing energy cooperation within the Eurasian Energy Union” (Novosti.az, January 29).
Meanwhile, however, the European Union is currently in the process of creating its own Energy Union, which will replace its heretofore existent Energy Community (of which Turkey is an observer but not a formal member) (EurActiv, February 26). Maros Sefcovic, the European Commission vice president responsible for the EU Energy Union, has noted that the Union will assist member states in their negotiations with important suppliers such as Russia for natural gas. And under its expansive energy strategy, the European Energy Union aims to support over 1 billion euros in investment in energy projects until 2020, as well as pass a strategically coordinated list of energy reform legislation. Sefcovic also declared that strategic cooperation with Turkey will be pursued within the European Energy Union in order to lay the groundwork for a genuine common energy market for Europe. The EU, he promised, will use all foreign policy instruments at its disposal to establish strategic energy partnerships with production or transit countries such as Turkey, Azerbaijan and Gibraltar, as well as other potential suppliers (Hurriyet Daily News, March 16).
Turkey’s central role within the Southern Gas Corridor and its potential relations with or even inclusion in an EU Energy Union structure is threatening to Russia’s continued dominant position—particularly, in the energy sphere—in the region Moscow considers its “near abroad.” Consequently, Moscow has been pressing Ankara to agree to Russian proposals and trying to imply that Europe is not happy with the energy partnership between Russia and Turkey (Verda Ozer, Hurriyet, February 14, 2015; CNNTURK, December 2, 2014). Moreover, it has been working hard to convince Turkey that a closer partnership with Russia, over other regional players, will be most beneficial to Turkey over the long term (Kanal A, December, 4, 2014).
Turkey is currently trying to decide which of the two similar though competing projects—the Eurasian or the European Energy Union—would be more beneficial for the country. Considering the partially overlapping memberships of the two structures, especially in the Balkans, it remains to be seen how viable it will be for both energy unions to exist simultaneously; or if, in fact, there can be some way to integrate both projects in the future. Moreover, Russia’s attempts to build an ever closer relationship with Turkey—and the latter’s openness to such gestures—will complicate regional energy geopolitics further.
Thus, Brussels and Ankara are likely to disagree on strategically important energy security issues over the coming years unless Turkey and the EU can achieve tighter cooperation under the framework of the European Energy Union. But if Turkey instead starts to pursue a more independent policy, particularly one at odds with the European Union, the Eurasian region will experience ever more unstable and competitive energy geopolitics.
Orhan Gafarli
First published in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 92 a program of The Jamestown Foundation