From the Editor: COP28 delivers historic milestone, but it’s not the naming of Lord Voldemort [Gas in Transition]

A key early success at COP28 was an agreement to operationalise the ‘loss and damage’ fund for countries vulnerable to climate change, but doing so did not result in a massive inflow of funds. At the time of writing, pledges stood at around $800mn, which will not go far. The US promised just $17.5mn.

There is still a massive gap between estimates of what is required in terms of international transfers to fund the energy transition globally, including loss and damage, and what the richer countries of this world appear willing to give.

The facts on the ground suggest this is an urgent issue. The vast majority of clean tech spending continues to take place in the advanced economies and China. The energy transition is very uneven, yet a global effort is required.

Lord Voldemort mentioned by name

COP28’s historic first mention of the term ‘fossil fuels’ was heralded as a major triumph, even if attempts to get hard language into the conference outcome on ‘phasing out’ or even ‘phasing down’ failed. The final text instead calls for the COP28 parties to contribute to “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, and equitable manner," with the aim of achieving net zero by 2050.

116 countries also signed the ‘Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency pledge’, the aim of which is to triple renewable energy capacity to at least 11,000 GW worldwide by 2030 and double the rate of energy efficiency improvement to 4% every year until 2030.

This reflects what both the International Energy Agency and the International Renewable Energy Agency said prior to the conference – both goals must be met, if the possibility of limiting a rise in global temperatures to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is to remain open.

The problem is that this is an unachievable goal. It was also notably not signed by the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, although, paradoxically, if there is one country which can achieve the new 2030 goal on a country basis, it is China.

The goal is unachievable not just because of the lack of international transfers and financial structures and policies to make more developing countries investable, but because the supply chains for the expansion of wind power on such a scale do not exist and are unlikely to be created within the next six years.

Solar PV is another matter. Its rate of deployment is spectacular and with continued policy support it could hit or even exceed its targeted role in the new 2030 goal. However, it is unlikely to do both this and make up for shortfalls in other areas.

Hydropower is still the largest source of renewable energy worldwide, but its rate of expansion is limited by the large capital requirements involved, the length of time such large-scale projects take to reach completion and a lack of suitable sites. Moreover, it does not escape environmental scrutiny and has, in some places, for example Chile, been rejected because of its local environmental impacts, despite the fact that it would provide large-scale renewable power.

As hydropower will expand only incrementally, the onus for growth falls massively on solar and wind, but the latter is not demonstrating the exponential growth required.

What is surprising about the 2030 tripling goal is, in fact, its short-term nature. We may be reeling from the historic mention of fossil fuels. But note also that this is the first time politicians have set a major climate goal, the failure or success of which will be clearly evident while many will still be on the political stage. Clearly, they have thrown caution to the wind.

The beginning of the end?

Does the mention of ‘transitioning away’ herald the beginning of the end for fossil fuels? Maybe yes, but it’s far less clear what the transition pathway will be for the individual fossil fuels. COP28 has shied away from a prescriptive energy transition blueprint, recognising that there are many different roads forward, depending on the unique circumstances of each country.

Moreover, climate change is not the only goal – energy security, food security and economic development are no less or more important as a result of climate change. Indeed, they could well become more urgent priorities because of climate change, requiring short-term responses which do not necessarily align with the longer-term goal of emissions reductions.

The most important words in the agreed text are not ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’, but the manner in which countries choose to do it, which is to be ‘just, orderly and equitable’. The COP28 parties have agreed on the goal and to some extent the timing, but not the means. Each country can decide what justice, equity and orderliness represent and interpretations will inevitably differ.

Developing economies, some with major gas resources, are told, on the one hand, not to develop new fossil fuel production and, on the other, that there will be little in the way of international solidarity when it comes to managing an energy transition playbook designed by those that can afford it and who have every intention of benefitting from it. Where is the equity in this?

Environmentalists argue that leaving such leeway leaves open the extended use of fossil fuels. They are right. But as goals like the 2030 tripling of renewable energy capacity and doubling of the rate of energy efficiency improvement are unachievable, then it stands to reason that the use of fossil fuels will be extended beyond the time and above the level which they advocate.

If fossil fuel use is prescriptively cut short, the energy transition may be unjust, disorderly and inequitable. In fact, to an extent, it already displays these characteristics.

So where do we stand?

The tens of thousands of COP28 participants have flown home. Ambitions are higher, timelines are more pressing, and the conference has finally recognised the existence of fossil fuels by name.

But outside the conference arena, coal use and its emissions will end the year at record levels, a third of the world population still lacks access to clean cooking technologies and hundreds of millions remain without electricity.

Even before delving into the essential use of natural gas in fertilizer production and its benefits in terms of clean cooking and abating the deforestation which accompanies the use of traditional biomass in the home, we have to get used to the idea that gas consumption needs to grow, if coal and oil consumption are to fall.

This, of course, makes methane emissions control a top priority, as gas producers cannot expect a social licence to operate, if they are contributing more to the problem than they are to the solution.

For many developing countries with gas resources, developing them represents justice and equity because it will provide some of the finance for economic and social development, for clean cooking and electrification, problems which do not affect the advanced economies.

A low emissions pathway scores higher when it comes to justice, equity and orderliness than does a zero emissions pathway. As it stands, the ratcheting up of capacity and efficiency targets to ever higher levels in the context of still minimal international solidarity in terms of climate finance arguably puts the energy transition for the Global South further out of reach rather than bringing it closer.