Algeria: Regional Security in Spotlight following AQIM Attack on Gas Facilities
On 16 January, members of the Al-Mulathameen Brigage (the Masked Brigade) linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attacked a gas facility in south-eastern Algerian close to the Libyan border, leading to the death of approximately 58 hostages, with roughly 32 militants reportedly killed. Over 100 foreigners and close to 700 Algerian workers are believed to have escaped the facility during the hostage crisis. While AQIM’s presence within Algeria is typically strongest in the Berber-dominated north-eastern Kabylie region, the group has been forced to establish a strengthened presence in the south because of Algerian security measures. Weak border security in Libya and instability in Mali have in turn increased the risk throughout the country. Algeria has in many respects become the key player in the French led intervention, drawing the ire of militant groups who had previously vowed to engage in reprisals against any country involved in an armed intervention. The attack on the In Amenas gas facility operated by BP, Statoil and Sonatrach in Algeria demonstrates that militant Islamist groups affiliated with or linked to AQIM are seeing through on their threat.
Terrorism risk highest in Algeria and along its border
Despite the highly localised terrorism risk in Algeria, weak border security in Libya and instability in Mali has increased the risk throughout the country. As such, according to Maplecroft’s 2013 Terrorism Risk Index, Algeria is classed as an “extreme” risk country largely due to the strong presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). While AQIM’s presence has conventionally been concentrated in the Berber-dominated north-eastern Kabylie region, the group has been forced to establish a strengthened presence in the south because of Algerian security measures. It operates along the Malian, Mauritanian and Libyan borders. The battle against AQIM and related militant Islamist groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in northern Mali represents a conventional armed conflict. If the intervention of French forces and ECOWAS is successful in wrestling a modicum of control away from these groups, Mali and neighbouring states including Algeria and Mauritania are likely to bear the largest fallout from the conflict. The risk of militant Islamist cells launching fresh assaults in neighbouring states would have increased.While members of AQIM and other militant groups in northern Mali are likely to enter into Mali’s other northern neighbours, Mauritania and Niger, AQIM’s already strong presence in Algeria ensures that the terrorism risk remains highest in that country. This is reflected in Maplecroft’s 2013 Terrorism Risk Index, as Mauritania and Libya are classed as “medium risk,” although these risk profiles have increased for the short term forecast. Companies operating near the Libyan border typically face higher risks given the weak border control on the Libyan side. The Libyan government’s inability to project control over the periphery including its border with Algeria constitutes a particular security risk. Illustratively, Algerian security officials warned in April 2011 that AQIM had acquired sophisticated weapons, including surface-to-air missiles from Libya. Although Libya closed border posts with Algeria and its other neighbours in December 2012, the central government’s reliance on local brigades and former rebel fighters with divided loyalties for security exacerbates instability in border areas. Trade routes used to smuggle illicit goods and weapons are fought over -- AQIM is heavily involved in these activities.
Northern Mali instability provides AQIM with greater operational freedom
AQIM and other militant Islamist groups’ control over northern Mali and weak security along Libya’s borders has provided the organisation with greater operational freedom. AQIM has been able to absorb weapons from the Libyan and Malian armies, and its diverse revenue streams, which include drug trafficking alongside ransom from kidnappings and other illicit activities, provide an important source of sustainable funding for the organisation. It seems the Algerian government’s fears regarding the potential impact that intervention would have on the country has been realised. While the government has been concerned that militant Islamists were gaining a stronger foothold over northern Mali, its initial position for a negotiated political solution was rooted in the fear that intervention would cause a cascade of security incidents across the region. Algeria has sanctioned the use of its air space for the French military campaign, and has ‘closed’ the border with Mali to make it harder for militant groups to access supplies and shelter. AQIM had been clear that armed intervention in Mali would result in retribution for countries that supported intervention. The attack on the In Amenas gas facility operated by BP, Statoil and Sonatrach within Algeria demonstrates that AQIM is seeing through on its promise.
Algeria’s role in French intervention likely to increase the risk of retaliatory terrorist attacks
Despite its past public proclamations in favour of a political solution, Algeria has become in many respects the key player in the French led intervention in northern Mali. Given its long history of opposing French intervention in the region, Algeria’s coordination with French forces has drawn the ire of militant groups viewing the country as colluding with a former colonial power. While the Algerian government, along with the West have always constituted a target for AQIM, events in Mali have increased the risk of reprisals. Indications that France was bolstering its resources to include the deployment of ground forces, suggests that Algeria is likely to be drawn even more into the conflict.Algeria’s diplomatic balancing act has also likely shifted towards reluctantly supporting foreign intervention. The government’s support of both the internationally recognised government in Bamako, while also calling for dialogue with Islamists in the north will be difficult to sustain given Algeria’s coordination with French forces.Algeria increased security measures around oil and gas facilities in the southern provinces following attacks that targeted the National Gendarmerie headquarters in Tamanrasset in March 2012, but these measures have clearly proven inadequate. Algeria is likely to significantly bolster security around its existing petroleum facilities with pipelines in particular expected to receive considerable protective resources. Since Algeria is likely to remain a focus of reprisals from AQIM and its affiliated groups in the short term, oil and gas infrastructure will continue to be a target. Algerian authorities have recently increased the pressure on AQIM, with army forces carrying out extensive counterterrorism operations that have led to the killing of several “emirs” of the organisation. These efforts will nonetheless be frustrated by porous borders across the Sahara / Sahel region. Security forces have in turn worked over decades to dislodge the organisational presence of the country away from the population centres towards its disparate southern border. The fact that AQIM and its affiliated network controlling northern Mali have the potential to re-enter through the south of the country is emblematic of the diffuse and sustainable nature of the organisation. Its “franchise” networked structure suggests that the threat is unlikely to diminish any time soon.
Risk of kidnapping remains high
The brazen attack is a significant one, and reflects the persistent high risk of kidnappings in Algeria. Despite a decline in the number of recorded incidents since 2011, foreigners are increasingly being targeted when incidents do occur.The impact on foreign companies operating in Algeria had been limited in recent years. The last high profile incident occurred in January 2010, when two Algerian nationals working for Canadian engineering company SNC Lavalin were kidnapped near Djerbahia approximately 150km southeast of Algiers.Companies with operations in more remote areas of the country where there is a weaker security presence face a higher risk of terrorist attacks and kidnappings. Algeria’s borders with Libya, Mauritania and Mali face particular security risks.
The article is provided by Maplecroft, a Natural Gas Europe Industry Partner. Maplecroft has been collating, analysing and mapping worldwide occurrences of terrorism and political violence from open sources for several years. The Maplecroft Terrorism Dashboard (MTD) builds on this work to provide a comprehensive picture of terrorism trends in every country through a proprietary GIS mapping platform that will be updated with new terrorist events regularly. For more information on this, please email at info@maplecroft.com or call +44 (0)1225 420000.