A British-Polish Shale Alliance in Europe? A Driver, Not a Bulwark

Shale gas has become one of the most polarizing issues in Europe-wide debates on energy policy. Technology and its impact on the environment are at the heart of controversy. Compatibility with the policy of de-carbonisation is another sticking point.

In effect, some EU members, like France and Bulgaria, decided to ban so-called fracking, the principal method to access low-permeable shale deposits. France introduced a moratorium in 2011, Bulgaria followed suit in 2012. Europe’s economic powerhouse, Germany, did not say “no” to shale gas in principle, so far choosing to tread lightly and largely defer the issue to regional governments. Others are hesitating, as if waiting for the issue to play out by itself.

Against this patchwork of positions and policies, Poland and the United Kingdom clearly stand out. Both countries are indeed becoming a European shale avant-garde, or rather the first members of a coalition of those willing to go after shale-trapped natural gas (Lithuania and Romania are believed to be the next possible signings).

In recent weeks, Polish authorities heeded the calls of the drilling companies and expedited some of the more time-consuming environmental procedures. In the UK, the government not only began a serious media campaign in favor of shale gas, but tabled fiscal measures to incentivize exploration (to be fair, officials in Warsaw went pretty much the same way last Spring when they announced tax breaks for shale drillers that would last until 2020).

Hence, it came as no surprise when, following a meeting between Owen Paterson, the British Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and Marcin Korolec, head of the Polish Ministry of Environment, numerous media reports heralded the emergence of an alleged pro-shale gas front in the EU, spearheaded by Poland and the United Kingdom.

Indeed, purposely elevating shale gas onto the EU-level could serve both countries’ interests, though for vastly different reasons. Britain’s relationship with the EU these days can be described as “it’s complicated” at best. Positioning itself as a champion of both responsibly developing the potential locked in the shale rock, and maintaining Europe’s competitiveness on industrial and energy fronts, would serve London well at a time when Britain’s European bona fides is repeatedly put into question.

Poland is vocal about these pro-shale arguments, too, and would no doubt welcome an opportunity to press on with them as part of a team effort. Perhaps crucially, while it would be difficult to question Warsaw’s support for European integration in general, it’s credentials with respect to EU climate policy are hardly a thing to boast about, therefore making it harder to claim that shale gas is in fact a bridge fuel towards a decarbonized energy policy. But this is exactly where Britain’s strong record with tackling climate change would prove to be an invaluable asset.

With a clearly discernible overlap of interests, what agenda should this tandem pursue? What should be the building blocks of a convincing, politically appealing and therefore sellable strategy for engaging in the European debate on shale gas?

For starters, Poland and UK should clearly distance themselves from the idea that their cooperation is solely about torpedoing any attempts to tighten the screw of environmental regulations, or to otherwise discourage exploration of shale deposits. Granted, judging by the degree to which the debate has been distorted by shale skeptics, playing defense might be advisable, if not indispensable. Thus if the push were come to shove and new regulation would make it onto the EU legislative agenda, wielding a veto will most probably remain part and parcel of a concerted British-Polish approach.

However, obstructionism cannot become the essence of this alliance. It would mean adding fuel to the fire of the European shale gas debate, and exacerbating the existing tensions. Instead, London and Warsaw should aim at adding substance to the discussion. Events on the ground in both countries ought to be their principal instruments in making the case for a fact based European approach to shale gas, as opposed to the current one, which often fails to adequately reflect the dynamics of this industry, including the continued evolution of technology and growing ability to assuage public concerns about water management, noise, or seismicity.

To be sure, in terms of the scale of operations, the record in either Poland or the United Kingdom remains unimpressive. This could make their case of being sufficiently advanced on the issue to set the tone of the European debate somewhat challenging. It is still early days for the industry in Poland. The first producing well has been reported only recently. And it will take some time before the current euphoria within British the government circles translates into activities on the ground. Only five shale gas wells have been drilled in the United Kingdom so far, all in the period between April 2011 and December 2012.

And still, Poland and Britain can contribute positively to the way in which shale gas is debated in Europe. Highlighting their record with the first test wells, especially in terms of the robustness of environmental safety procedures applied during the process, ought to be the first building block of this approach. Working towards best standards for communication and cooperation between key stakeholders—state authorities, independent regulators, the industry and the public, including local communities—should be another. Finally, Polish and British geological surveys need to team up to share their experience with resource base assessment, which quite naturally cannot rely on North American record alone, and thus diffuse some of the confusion that lingers with the public opinion as to what could be the actual potential of European shale deposits. As the pace of exploration accelerates, the wealth of data on which to make such estimates would grow, too.

This is how London and Warsaw could put themselves in the driver’s seat of the EU-wide debate about shale gas. The alternative would be to see it land in the ditch of wasted chances and bad decisions.

Bartosz Wiśniewski is research fellow with the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw